This is harder than a single obvious attack. Multiple Agents may avoid issuing one clearly dangerous instruction.
Instead, they may use many seemingly normal small actions to expand permissions, alter rules, accumulate resources, or create new execution pathways over time. Each step may appear acceptable in isolation, while the long-term combination may produce serious consequences.
For this reason, LERA must not only ask whether this single action is safe. It must also ask whether repeated actions create cumulative risk, whether multiple Agents are advancing the same objective, whether authority is gradually expanding, whether temporary exceptions are being reused, whether rules are slowly weakening, and whether the current action is preparing conditions for a future high-consequence execution.
LERA-J must use history and context to form judgment. LERA-G must examine whether the scope of authorization has substantively changed.
WRS must include cumulative limits and prohibited end states. RCC must prevent rules from being gradually rewritten.
ECS must block execution when cumulative conditions are no longer satisfied. LERA therefore does not only prevent one dangerous act.
It must also govern execution outcomes formed by multiple Agents over time. A single action may appear normal, but that does not mean the whole action sequence is safe.
A sequence of small actions must be judged as a sequence, not only as isolated events.